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ABSTRACT	  
	  
The	  Swiss	  economy	  represents	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  legal	  origin	  theory	  (e.g.,	  Roe	  (2006)).	  Although	  
Switzerland	   is	   a	   country	   belonging	   to	   the	   civil	   law	   family,	   many	   of	   its	   public	   companies	   have	  
diffused	  corporate	  ownership,	  as	  do	  those	   in	  common	   law	  countries.	  This	  paper	  maintains	  that	  
the	   Swiss	   exception	   relies	   on	   the	   complementarity	   between	   corporate	   ownership	   and	   policies	  
addressing	   employment	   protection	   and	   innovation.	   The	   Swiss	   case	   presents	   two	   lessons:	   first,	  
the	   current	   corporate	   governance	   is	   the	   result	   of	   a	   long	   and	   composite	   path	   in	  which	   politics	  
plays	  a	  pivotal	  role;	  second,	  the	  institutional	  differences	  and	  similarities	  across	  countries,	  which	  
one	  would	  try	  to	  explain	  along	  with	  the	  legal	  origin	  theory,	  can	  derive	  diversely	  from	  additional	  
politics-­‐based	   accounts,	   such	   as	   those	   referring	   to	   policies	   on	   employment	   protection	   and	  
innovation.	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“Corporations	  are	  essentially	  political	  constructs”	  
-­‐	  Adolf	  A.	  Berle	  (1967)	  
Preface	  to	  the	  revised	  edition	  of	  
The	  Modern	  Corporation	  &	  Private	  Property	  
	  
	  
	  
1. The issue 
 
Recent literature notes that Switzerland represents an exception to the legal origin 
theory—Mark Roe writes, “Switzerland fits awkwardly with a legal origin perspective” 
(Roe 2006:508)—for the fact that, though it is a civil law country, its economy is 
characterized by large firms with diffused corporate ownership which resembles those of 
common law countries.1 Our account of the Swiss exception relies on complementarities 
between diffuse corporate ownership and politics addressing weak employment protection 
and supporting the so-called radical innovation. This means that politics did not complete 
its influence on institutions back when the legal families originated but continues to be a 
driver for the evolution of the governance of corporations.  
In a similar “political economy” perspective,2 Mark Roe (2006) argues that the destruction 
and military occupation during WWII, which ruined European institutions, heightened 
voters’ insecurity. In Austria, France, Germany, and Italy, the financial savings of the 
middle class were devastated, and, therefore, for decades after 1945, typical voters in such 
nations have cared little about protecting financial capital because they had little of it, 
whereas their well-being was tied more to their human capital (Roe 2006:498). Because of 
the WWII, in Austria, France, Germany, and Italy, the median voter forced politicians to 
create strong labour protection rather than protect financial capital. Consequently, 
corporate owners in these countries reacted by concentrating ownership. That is, stronger 
employees’ political rights (“stronger social democracies”, in the terminology of Roe 
(2003)) induced owners of corporations in neighbouring countries of Switzerland to react 
by creating a higher concentration of corporate ownership in order to safeguard their 
quasi-rents.  
On the contrary, Switzerland, which during WWII “suffered neither a military occupation 
nor a violent revolution” (Roe 2006:509), continued to have a labour law characterized by 
relatively weaker protection for workers and corporations with diffused ownership 
structures. This paper complements Roe’s account. Our argumentation adds that the Swiss 
exception also derives from policies both on innovation and on labour, including years 
before WWII. 
Exploring the complementarity between corporate ownership and labour protection, this 
paper illustrates the role of the 1937 Swiss “industrial peace agreement” in the evolution 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Pagano (2012), and Belloc and Pagano (2009, 2013) also advance a similar observation. 
2 Cf. Roe and Vatiero (2016) for a survey on this perspective. 
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of Swiss corporate governance. The Nazi-Fascism arising in the neighbouring states of 
Switzerland pushed Swiss employer and employee representatives to sign a peace 
agreement that shaped the Swiss corporate governance equilibrium. On the other hand, 
using the complementarity between corporate governance and innovation (e.g., Hall and 
Soskice (2001), Carlin and Mayer (2003)), this paper argues that the Swiss policies on 
intellectual property rights implemented at the end of the 19th century contribute to explain 
the Swiss exception. 
The main lesson to be learned from the Swiss case is that politics matters in the evolution 
of corporate governance and that institutional complementarities may constitute a 
hereditary mechanism that explains institutional diversities (cf. Aoki (2001), Pagano and 
Vatiero (2015), Vatiero (2016)). Institutional complementary theory suggests that various 
elements can consistently complement each other to form path-dependent economic 
outcomes within broader institutional contexts (see also Pagano and Vatiero (2015)).  In 
this paper, I emphasize that politics has a pivotal role in this path-dependence. 
For institutional complementarity, multiple equilibria arise, and the convergence towards a 
certain Pareto-(in)efficient equilibrium will be more complicated in both theory and 
practice than a simple smooth and expectable change. On the one hand, changes via 
politics may not produce institutional or economic readjustments because of the costs of 
switching from one equilibrium to another; in this case, the initial political condition may 
have persistent ‘lock-in’ effects. On the other hand, changes may put in action a circular 
and cumulative causation leading to large variation of institutions and economic equilibria 
(cf. Pagano and Vatiero (2015)). For instance, because of the complementarities between 
innovation and corporate governance, as will be introduced in Section 4, the rise of radical 
innovative sectors (such as information technology and biotechnologies) around the world 
in the last decades should push countries towards a corresponding corporate equilibrium 
characterized by flexibility of assets. In fact, economic institutions in Germany have 
experienced a shift towards a pro-flexibility direction for the past two or three decades, in 
which industry-wide collective bargaining has declined, and the bargaining system has 
turned significantly more fragmented and pluralist (cf. Streeck (2011)). This has also led 
to the weakening of political paradigm on which the German system of industrial relations 
has based its competitiveness. Similar processes have been observed in other countries, 
including France and Italy (cf. Amable (2015)) and Japan (Lechevalier (2014)).  
For this reason, the historic distinction between the common-law and civil-law systems, as 
considered by the legal-origin theory, is only a part of the evolution of corporate 
governance regimes: Politics did not end its influence on institutions when legal origins 
began, but it continues to be a driving force. Indeed, as one can learn from the Swiss case, 
corporate ownership structures vary over time (and across nations) for policies addressing 
labour protection and innovation. 
More generally, using the Swiss case, I state that economic analysis should include the 
investigation of the establishment and evolution of the political arena. As originally noted 
by Olson (1982), institutional change is often the outcome of strategies aimed at 
improving the situation of some or all of the components of the dominant political elite. A 
further consequence is that such institutional changes “are not necessarily or even usually 
created to be socially efficient, rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve 
the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules” (North 1990:16). 
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The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, I illustrate the exception of 
Switzerland with respect to the legal origin theory. Section 3 focuses on the 
complementarity between corporate ownership and employment protection. Section 4 
discusses the institutional complementarity between corporate governance and innovation. 
Section 5 summarizes the	  results of the paper. 
 
 
2. Motivation: Counter-examples of the legal origin theory 
 
In a series of papers, Shleifer and his co-authors (e.g., La Porta et al. (1997), (1998), 
(1999), (2008)) affirm that the current structure of corporate ownership in big corporations 
is a consequence of the distinction between civil and common law systems. Such theory—
the so-called legal origin theory—accords a primary role to the roots of the legal system 
(common law vs. civil law) in the development of property rights, markets, and investor 
protection. 
The legal origin theory is consistent with a political economy view because it considers 
that institutions depend on political determinants, in particular on the dominant ideologies 
in France and England on the roles in the society of the King/Queen, Parliament, Judges 
and individuals. Indeed, Mahoney (2001:504) writes, “English common law developed 
because landed aristocrats and merchants wanted a system of law that would provide 
strong protections for property and contract rights, and limit the crown’s ability to 
interfere in markets”. By contrast, “French civil law developed as it did because the 
revolutionary generation, and Napoleon after it, wished to use state power to alter property 
rights and attempted to insure that judges did not interfere” (Mahoney 2001:505). 
Accordingly, legal families differ in terms of the ‘political priority’ they gave to private 
property rights relative to the rights of the state: a civil law system tends to centralize and 
intensify state power and therefore takes a more wary stance toward the development of 
free financial systems than a common law system (cf. also Beck and Levine (2005)). 
Using data from La Porta et al. (1999) on the corporate ownership structure of large 
publicly traded firms and La Porta et al. (1998)’s distinction between common and civil 
law countries, however, one can find some exceptions to the legal origin theory (cf. Table 
1). For example, Japan and South Korea, two civil law countries exhibit (in 1995) ratios of 
widely held firms that are more similar to common law countries than civil law ones; also, 
Israel, Singapore, and Hong Kong, three common law countries, have ratios that are more 
similar to civil law countries than common law ones. Beyond such ‘Eastern exceptions’, 
Europe also has (at least) one exception: Switzerland, which is a country with a system of 
civil law that has high ratios of widely held firms that are more similar to common law 
countries than civil law countries.3 This Swiss exception is more remarkable if we 
compare Switzerland with its neighbouring civil law systems, i.e., Austria, France, 
Germany, and Italy.4 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 On the fact that Switzerland belongs to civil law family, cf. also Le Roy and Schönenberger (2002:64-74). 
4 Unfortunately, there are not data on Luxembourg in La Porta et al. (1999). 
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Starting from this observation, I propose a novel political economy explanation for this 
exception.5 Using the institutional complementarity theory, I describe why corporate 
ownership can vary across different national combinations of policies that address labour 
protection and innovation. 
 
 
3. The domain of labour 
 
Roe (2006) claims that the Swiss exception derives from different policies after WWII on 
the labour between Switzerland and its neighboring states. He argues that after WWII, in 
Italy, France, Austria, and Germany, the political pressures for strengthening the political 
rights of workers implied a reaction of owners in terms of concentration of corporate 
ownership.6 Aoki (2010), Belloc and Pagano (2009, 2013), and Pagano (2012), among 
others, suggest that there is a complementarity between labour protection and corporate 
ownership. This means that two equilibria of corporate governance may emerge. As an 
arms race, one is the “disarmed” corporate governance equilibrium with a low level of 
employment protection and low capital concentration; the second one is the “armed” 
corporate governance equilibrium with heightened protection of employees and high 
concentration of ownership. This implies that the characterization of one domain (either 
corporate ownership or labour protection) affects, via complementarity, the 
characterization of the other. I advance the hypothesis that because the level of 
employment protection was low, Switzerland did not experience a concentration of the 
ownership, as its neighbouring countries did.  
Compared to other European countries, the Swiss labour market has a high degree of 
flexibility and relatively little employment protection regulation (cf. also Bonoli and Mach 
2001, Duell et al. 2010, Baudenbacher 2012). Table 2 (columns 3a-c) shows that 
Switzerland has an employment protection system in place that is more similar to common 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Note that small firms are excluded by the sample in Table 1 and by the analysis of this article because the 
political struggle among different interests, which this work investigates, is more remarkable and relevant in 
large firms than small ones (see Davies et al. 2009:306). Including small firms the percentage of widely held 
firms is significantly lower (see Faccio and Lang (2002)). In particular, Hofstetter (2002:8) reports that, 
including also small firms, two out of three of all Swiss companies have a controlling shareholder. However, 
Anderson and Hertig (1994) report that Swiss economy is dominated by large listed firms: as of the early 
1990s, the 30 largest Swiss corporations accounted for almost 80% of the total market capitalisation. 
6 Corporate law may affect corporate ownership, as well. Since its first formulation, a liberal, individualistic-
capitalist perspective has characterized Swiss corporate law and, therefore, has contributed to the persistence 
of diffused corporate ownership. Conversely, Germany, from where Switzerland imported its first 
formulation of corporate law, after WWII introduced co-determination, as consequence of political pressures 
of middle class whose income depended on human capital rather than physical assets, along with Roe’s 
(2003, 2006) argument. Note that, here, the introduction of co-determination can be seen as one of policies 
addressing labour protection (e.g., via workers’ voice). This means that differences in corporate law between 
Switzerland and Germany (and other European countries) are consequences of differences in policies 
concerning workers’ protection. For this reason, our attention in this section is dedicated to the domain of 
labour. 
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law countries than its neighbouring countries. Column 4 of Table 2, moreover, reports that 
the disarmed corporate governance equilibrium characterizes not only common-law 
nations but also (exceptionally) Switzerland. The reported data support the hypothesis that 
Swiss corporate governance is more similar to that of common law countries than to the 
corporate governance that characterizes Switzerland’s neighbours—Austria, France, 
Germany, and Italy—which belong to the civil law family. 
 
[Insert the table 2 here] 
 
This paper complements the argument of Roe (2006), based on labour protection policies 
adopted after WWII, by introducing a further shock that took place before WWII: the 
1937 Swiss “industrial peace agreement” (Friedensabkommen or Vereinbarung zur 
Einhaltung des Arbeitsfriedens in German, Convention de paix du travail in French). This 
agreement, which first appeared in the metalworking industry and was initially accepted 
for two years, has been renewed at five-year intervals ever since and has spread to almost 
all industrial sectors, becoming a cornerstone of Swiss industrial relations. Reflecting the 
Swiss desire for concordance and dislike of conflict (cf. Steinberg (2011)), the 1937 
agreement set up a dispute resolution procedure that included a peace clause. 
This peace agreement produced three main results: 
1. Because it was not based on legal requirements but on contractual provisions defined by 
the parties,7 the current norms governing labour relations do not form a distinct labour 
code but are incorporated in the Code of Obligations alongside contracts. 
2. Wages are, to a large extent, fixed at the individual firm’s level, leaving employers free 
to negotiate with their own workforce (cf. also Baudenbacher (2012)). Consistently, in 
1976, the Swiss people rejected a popular initiative for employee’s participation launched 
by unions in order to introduce German-like co-determination.8 
3. Finally, because of the peace agreement, Switzerland has the lowest annual strike rates 
out of all the OECD countries (cf. Duell et al. (2010), Steinberg (2011), Baudenbacher 
(2012)). 
Given the non-conflictual, contract-based relationship between labour and capital in 
Switzerland, workers did not ask to national politics for particularly higher protections, 
and, therefore, there was not the necessity of concentrating ownership for owners to 
defend their corporate quasi-rent. For this reason, the Swiss industrial peace agreement, 
which had contributed to a low level of employment protections in Switzerland, has a 
prominent role in the enduring nature of diffused corporate ownership in Swiss firms. 
In this respect, it is worthy to underline the influence of politics. The political environment 
of neighbouring nations, in particular, played an important role. The 1937 peace 
agreement stems from the fear of employer and employee representatives that the federal 
government might impose a sort of corporatism similar to what occurred in Nazi-Fascist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The signatory organizations undertook to ensure that the agreement was followed by their members, with 
each party depositing a security of francs 250,000 in the Swiss National Bank and contractual penalties 
issued in case of infringement. 
8 I am in debt with Prof. Baudenbacher for reminding me of the 1976 initiative.  
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nations, like Germany and Italy. Consequently, the threat of government intervention was 
an essential factor leading to the peace agreement (cf. Lambelet (1993), Broussolle 
(2009)). The strategy adopted by employer and employee’s representatives was aimed at 
obtaining mutual recognition without falling under state control. In one of the last 
meetings before the signing of the peace agreement, the president of SMUV (the main 
metalworkers’ union) affirmed: “we must persuade workers that we will still be threatened 
by fascism for a long time” (quoted in Broussolle 2009:282). Again, SMUV’s leading 
official stated: “if we reach an agreement in these relatively easy times, it should also be 
workable when times become harder [war is threatening Europe]” (quoted in Broussolle 
2009:281). Employers and employee representatives feared that without an agreement, i.e. 
the 1937 peace agreement, the government, encouraged by the Nazi-Fascism political 
movements, would impose direct controls and guild unions resembling the fascist model. 
Thus, for the introduction of the 1937 Swiss peace agreement, the influence of foreign 
politics had a key role. 
 
 
4. Swiss equilibrium of corporate governance and innovation 
 
A further complementarity based on political choices relates to the interaction between the 
form of corporate governance and the kind of innovation (Carlin and Mayer (2000), 
(2003), Mayer (2000), Hall and Soskice (2001), and Pagano (2012)). This literature argues 
that there is a complementarity between armed corporate governance equilibrium and 
incremental sectors (which involve specific investments, where the term specificity is 
intended along with Oliver Williamson’s (1985) contribution) and a complementarity 
between disarmed corporate governance equilibrium and radical innovation (which relates 
with general-purpose investments) (cf. Hall and Soskice (2001), Pagano (2012), Roe and 
Vatiero (2016)). In other words, corporate governance structures characterized by high 
corporate ownership concentration and high labour protection encourage activities with a 
“modular” step-by-step progression (i.e., incremental innovation) and committed assets 
(i.e., asset-specificity). Conversely, corporate governance structures characterized by low 
corporate ownership concentration and low employment protection stimulate all-or-
nothing or path-breaking innovation (i.e., radical innovation), providing greater flexibility 
of work and of capital (i.e., general-purpose assets).  
In more detail, Hall and Soskice (2001) underline that the armed equilibrium provides 
“more institutional support for the strategic interactions required to realize the value of co-
specific assets, whether in the form of industry-specific training, collaborative research 
and development, or the like” (Hall and Soskice 2001:17); indeed, firms in the armed 
equilibrium are characterized by strong trade unions (which very often supervise 
collaborative training schemes), powerful work councils, high levels of employment 
protection, and job tenures. These conditions offer the assurance of positions if employees 
invest in specific skills. Instead, the more fluid markets of the disarmed equilibrium 
“provide economic actors with greater opportunities to move their research around in 
search of higher returns, encouraging them to acquire switchable assets, such as general 
skills or multi-purpose technologies” (Hall and Soskice 2001:17). Representative 
incremental sectors are transport, mechanical elements, electrical machinery, civil 
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engineering, and chemical engineering, while radical sectors consist of information 
technology, pharmaceutical, biotechnology, chemistry, and medical sectors (cf. Hall and 
Soskice 2001). 
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 3 report that disarmed equilibria relate with radical innovation. 
The striking finding is that Swiss innovation is more similar to that of the common law 
countries than to that of its neighbouring civil law countries. I hypothesize that policies 
addressing radical innovation encouraged the evolution of the Swiss economy towards a 
disarmed equilibrium. 
 
[Insert table 3 here] 
 
As noted by many authors (e.g., Kronstein and Till (1948), Machlup and Penrose (1950), 
Schiff (1971), Kaufer (1989), Moy (1993), Baudenbacher (2012)), Switzerland passed 
through almost the entire 19th century without patent legislation. Before 1888, the year of 
the adoption of the first Swiss federal patent law, several attempts to introduce a patent 
system failed (Machlup and Penrose (1950), Schiff (1971), Kaufer (1989), Baudenbacher 
(2012)). According to this literature, “because the Swiss economy was small, the incentive 
that Swiss industry received from patented exports was arguably greater than the incentive 
that dominating the domestic Swiss economy via patenting might have supplied” (Moy 
1993:486). That is, Switzerland wished “to enrich her own industries by securing 
technological developments from abroad for nothing” (Kronstein and Till 1948:778-779). 
In fact, Switzerland did not find it in its interest to enact a national patent system until 
Germany threatened her with retaliatory tariff action (Schiff (1971), Moy (1993)). The 
Swiss case shows that it may be advantageous not to have a patent law, assuming that 
domestic inventive capabilities are sufficient to a “free-ride” by imitating the technologies 
already developed by foreign enterprises (Kaufer 1989:48). 
I complement this view by emphasizing the “political” influence of Swiss radical 
industries. Radical industries (e.g., chemical and pharmaceutical industries) played an 
important role in the war against patent protection (Schiff (1971), Baudenbacher (2012)). 
Indeed, the 1888 patent law excluded chemical, pharmaceutical, and dyeing inventions—
for this reason, Schiff writes that 1888 patent law was “probably the most incomplete and 
selective patent law ever enacted in modern times” (Schiff 1971:93). While incremental 
sectors, like the watch-making industry, called for the introduction of a strong national 
patent system (see Schiff 1971:91), radical sectors opposed this introduction. 
Why? One reason derives from different features between radical and incremental 
innovation. As originated noted by Hall and Soskice (2001), incremental innovation 
relates with specific investments. Because of specificity, the re-deployment in alternative 
uses of specific assets is costly. Indeed, specific assets are locked in specific relationships. 
On the contrary, radical innovation relates with general or multi-purpose investments. This 
means that the re-deployment of assets is relatively simpler than in incremental innovation 
and also implies that radical technologies can be more easily imitated and imported from 
outside than incremental technology. Indeed, while the relocation of incremental 
innovation would require the relocation of a strict nexus of specific relationships, which in 
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turn could involve many assets and agents, the relocation of radical innovation is 
relatively less reliant on specified, localized, and locked relationships, assets, and agents.  
The case of Fuchsin (a chemical product) is paradigmatic of the relative simplicity that 
exists to import foreign radical innovation. 
In 1859, an Alsatian (French) firm had invented an improved method for the 
production of aniline red, a dyestuff, which it wanted to sell under the name Azalein. 
Another firm which owned an older French product patent for aniline red that was 
marketed under the name Fuchsin successfully opposed the sale of Azalein under 
French law. The Alsatian firm therefore moved its production to Basle where it 
lawfully produced aniline red under the name Fuchsin at half of the French price 
(Baudenbacher 2012:476, see also Kronstein and Till (1948:774, fn. 47). 
In a similar manner, 
[m]ore firms established themselves in Basel at that time and the basis for today’s 
world famous pharmaceutical industry was laid. It has been said that the Basel firms 
systematically imitated foreign, and in particular, German products. Commentators 
concluded that the introduction of patent protection was delayed for so many years 
out of economic opportunism. […] German industrial circles had called Switzerland a 
‘pirate state,’ the lack of patent protection a ‘parasitic system’ and accused the Swiss 
chemical industry of behaving like ‘robber barons.’ (Baudenbacher 2012:476, italics 
is added). 
Accordingly, by this “institutional arbitrage,” several chemical, medical, pharmaceutical 
firms (i.e., radical firms) moved to Switzerland, enjoying the possibility of freely working 
and trading resources that in other countries were protected by intellectual property law. In 
another sense, lobbying activities of radical sectors aimed at freely imitating or importing 
foreign-patented technologies (at least in the past9) had stimulated the growth of radical 
sectors. By this condition on the domain of innovation, via complementarity, Switzerland 
developed a flexible labour market that fits with radical innovation and supports diffused 
corporate ownership, namely, a disarmed corporate governance equilibrium that 
distinguishes the Swiss economy from its neighbouring countries. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Swiss corporate governance, which according to legal origin theory should belong to a 
civil law system, is characterized by diffused corporate ownership, weak labour 
protection, and radical innovation and resembles the common law systems more than its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 More recently, instead, Switzerland became one of the most important supporters of a “rigid” world-wide 
intellectual property right system. For instance, a report of US department of State of 1996 writes, 
“Switzerland is a member of all major international intellectual property rights conventions and was an 
active supporter of a strong IPR text in the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations.” (available http://1997-
2001.state.gov/www/issues/economic/trade_reports/europe_canada95/SWITZER.html). One reason could 
be that today Swiss technology, in particular in radical sectors where Switzerland is a leading economy, can 
be copied by or move to foreign (especially developing) countries. While Switzerland is not yet able to use 
the institutional arbitrage for importing or coping foreign technologies, today developing countries may 
exploit a similar institutional arbitrage to import and/or copy Swiss radical technologies.    
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neighbouring civil law countries, i.e., Austria, France, Germany, and Italy. This paper 
claims that the Swiss case is the result of a politics-driven evolution based on institutional 
complementarity between diffuse corporate ownership and weak employment protection 
on the one hand and on institutional complementarity between diffuse corporate 
governance and radical innovations on the other hand. 
From the Swiss case, one can learn that institutional complementarities call for an analysis 
of political context. Each transition (as well as each stasis of an economic system) is 
always influenced by the past political choices, which may favor or damage the growth of 
nations by changing the institutions of society.  
The Swiss exception results from what did not happen in Switzerland rather than what did. 
First, Switzerland escaped from the totalitarianism regimes of the 1930s and WWII. This 
explains the low level of political rights of workers. Second, Switzerland passed through 
the 19th century without a stringent patent regulation. This permitted the imitation and 
import of foreign technology, in particular, in radical sectors in which assets are relatively 
more flexible and less committed. Low protection of workers and radical sectors sustained 
(and were sustained by) a diffused corporate ownership. Hence, as shown in the case of 
Switzerland, political choices in the can affect economic outcomes—and this holds true 
not only for the past and very old political choices as those made between civil vs. 
common law. 
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Appendix   
 
Table 1: Legal origins and corporate ownership 
 
Country Legal family Widely held 20 largest 
firms 
Widely held 10 
medium-sized 
firms 
Diffused corporate 
ownership (on 
average) 
 (1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (3) 
Australia Common 0.55 0.65 0.10 0.30 0.40 
Canada Common 0.50 0.60 0.40 0.60 0.53 
Hong Kong Common 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.05 
Ireland Common 0.45 0.65 0.50 0.63 0.56 
Israel Common 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.08 
New Zealand Common 0.05 0.30 0.00 0.57 0.23 
Singapore Common 0.05 0.15 0.10 0.40 0.18 
UK Common 0.90 1.00 0.10 0.60 0.65 
USA Common 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.90 0.75 
Argentina Civil 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Austria Civil 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Belgium Civil 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.09 
Denmark Civil 0.10 0.40 0.00 0.30 0.20 
Finland Civil 0.15 0.35 0.00 0.20 0.18 
France Civil 0.30 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.23 
Germany Civil 0.35 0.50 0.10 0.10 0.26 
Greece Civil 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.04 
Japan Civil 0.50 0.90 0.20 0.30 0.48 
Italy Civil 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.09 
Mexico Civil 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Netherlands Civil 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.20 
Norway Civil 0.05 0.25 0.10 0.20 0.15 
Portugal Civil 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.03 
South Korea Civil 0.40 0.55 0.00 0.30 0.31 
Spain Civil 0.15 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.13 
Sweden Civil 0.00 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.11 
Switzerland Civil 0.50 0.60 0.40 0.50 0.50 
Mean common law systems 0.38 0.48 0.20 0.46 0.38 
Mean civil law systems 0.17 0.31 0.06 0.13 0.17 
 
(1): Countries are distinguished in legal families along with the distinction of La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
(2a), (2b), (2c), and (2d): These indicators are from La Porta et al. (1999). Indicators (2a) and (2b) refer to 
the 20 largest firms ranked by market capitalization of common equity at the end of the year 1995, while 
indicators (2c) and (2d) refer to the smallest 10 firms in each country with market capitalization of common 
equity of at least $500 million at the end of the year 1995. If in the firm there is not one shareholder with 
voting rights in the firms exceeding the cut-off value of 10% (indicators in columns 2a and 2c) or 20% 
(indicators in columns 2b and 2d), the firm is considered widely held. 
 
(3): This index is the average of the indicators of corporate ownership in columns (2a), (2b), (2c), and (2d). 
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Table 2: Legal origins and corporate equilibrium 
 
Country Legal family 
Diffused corporate 
ownership (on 
average) 
Employment protection Disarmed corporate governance equilibrium 
 (1) (2) (3a) (3b) (3c) (4) 
       
Canada Common 0.53 0.75 0.92 0.14 0.53+(1-0.14)=1.39 
UK Common 0.65 0.60 1.03 0.14 1.51 
USA Common 0.75 0.21 0.26 0.04 1.71 
Austria Civil 0.03 2.21 2.75 0.41 0.62 
France Civil 0.23 2.98 2.34 0.44 0.79 
Germany Civil 0.26 3.09 2.68 0.48 0.78 
Italy Civil 0.09 3.57 2.76 0.52 0.57 
Switzerland Civil 0.50 1.14 1.60 0.23 1.27 
 
(1): Countries are distinguished in legal families along with the distinction of La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
(2): Index in the column (3) of the Table 1. 
 
(3a): This indicator is from OECD (2013a) and refers to the year 1995—the year of data on corporate 
ownership. It is expressed on a scale from 0 (lowest employment protection) to 6 (highest employment 
protection).  
 
(3b) This indicator is from OECD (2013b) and refers to the year 1995—the year of data on corporate 
ownership. It is expressed on a scale from 0 (lowest employment protection) to 6 (highest employment 
protection). 
 
(3c) This index is the average of indicators of OECD in the preceding columns (3a, 3b), normalized to 1.  
 
(4) This index is the result of the following sum: the rate of widely held firms (column 2) + the complement 
to 1 of the indicator of employment protection (column 3c). A higher index stands for a corporate 
equilibrium with lower employment protection and lower corporate concentration, namely, a more 
“disarmed” corporate equilibrium. 
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Table 3: Legal origins, corporate governance, and innovation 
 
Country Legal family Disarmed corporate governance equilibrium 
Radicalness of 
innovation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Canada Common 1.39 1.36 
UK Common 1.51 1.24 
USA Common 1.71 1.63 
Austria Civil 0.62 0.54 
France Civil 0.79 0.81 
Germany Civil 0.78 0.61 
Italy Civil 0.57 0.65 
Switzerland Civil 1.27 1.21 
 
(1): Countries are distinguished in legal families along with the distinction of La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
(2): Index in the column (4) of the Table 2. 
 
(3) Using data on the number of granted patents by European Patent Offices, I created an index of 
radicalness of innovation for selected nations (US, UK, Canada, Switzerland, Austria, France, Germany, and 
Italy). This index denotes the specialism of a country in selected radical sectors (biotechnology, 
pharmaceuticals, medical technology and computer technology) relative to selected incremental sectors 
(transport, civil engineering and mechanical elements) by using data from the years 2004-2013 on the 
number of granted patents by European Patent Offices. The index is calculated as follows:  𝑖!"#$%&' = 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑑!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑎𝐷! 𝑃𝑎𝑡!𝑃𝑎𝑡! 
where 𝑖 indicates the index for a certain country, 𝑛 all countries of the sample, and 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑑 and 𝑃𝑎𝑡 stand 
for, respectively, the number of patents in selected radical sectors, and the number of patents in all selected 
sectors (i.e.: radical + incremental). 
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